When facts are found to be in conflict with the principle, a realist will abandon principle; a fanatic will abandon facts.
It behooves class warriors of every stripe to bear in mind the lessons we have learned from the great post-war European experiment in redistribution.
European nations, lately mostly excepting the United Kingdom, accepting the socialistic premise that benefits to economic players are essentially zero-sum, enshrined a grand bargain that protects the privileges and lion’s share of returns of the established elites at the cost of sharing a set portion of their pie with the working class. The ugly underside of this agreement, since the old working class is no longer so incentivized, is the need for an immigrant underclass to bear the brunt of undesirable work and the greatest economic uncertainty and pain.
The old working class, thus bought off, has predictably become mostly politically quiescent. It remains to be seen how the rising tensions with the mostly Islamic new underclass are going to play out over the coming decades, but the indications are, today, not too encouraging.
No sooner than we have declared the dearth of new elite formation, we are presented with evidence to the contrary. Time will tell whether the just-leave-me-be streak of libertarianism is anything but a pastime for eccentric billionaires or whether we are for an age of rule by the no-longer-Aspergers over the long haul.
Towards a theory of societal change and conflict: it can be argued that internal revolutions happen when new elites arise and gain power enough to challenge old ones. A corollary to this would be that revolutions such as these succeed when the old elites are weakened by war, insolvency or famine.
Despite the vaguely Marxist class-struggle overtones, such theory may yet hold merit, as evidenced by a good number of examples – to wit: the rise of generals and plebeian tribunes in the Roman Republic that led to civil war and ultimately to Octavian; the rise of mercantile elites in late-medieval Europe that led to toppling of lately-bankrupt French and English monarchies; the rise of the intellectual elites in the 19th century that led ultimately to Marxist revolutions in war-ravaged Russia and her neighbors.
Today, at least in the United States, no new elites appear to be rising, and even though ranks of old elites continue burgeoning, this theory would not advance an argument for pending revolution – unless, that is, the recent rise of technological entrepreneurs represents in fact emergence of a new and qualitatively different libertarian elite.
Pure democracy is indistinguishable from anarchy.
Populism is where all democracies sooner or later go to die.
Populism is the natural, and perhaps inevitable, consequence of wide-franchise democracy.
Modern left-wing intellectual thought today fetishizes weakness and victimhood as morally superior to power and strength, ironically harkening back to the foundations of the Christian mortality which it so vehemently rejects in all other aspects, excepting perhaps only their shared distaste for profit.